We conduct a sequential social learning experiment where subjects guess a hidden state after observing private signals and the guesses of a subset of their predecessors. A network determines the observable predecessors, and we compare subjects' accuracy on sparse and dense networks. Later agents' accuracy gains from social learning are twice as large in the sparse treatment compared to the dense treatment. Models of naive inference where agents ignore correlation between observations predict this comparative static in network density, while the result is difficult to reconcile with rational-learning models.
Introduction
In many economic situations, people form beliefs based on others' actions. In these settings, agents typically do not observe all members of the society, but only a select subset -namely, their neighbors in an underlying social network. How the structure of this observation network affects learning outcomes is thus a fundamental question for understanding social learning. While an extensive theoretical literature has explored this question for both naive and rational agents (e.g., Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar, 2011; Golub and Jackson, 2012) , much less is known empirically.
Density is one of the most basic properties of a network. How do learning patterns differ between sparse networks, where agents usually observe very few neighbors, and dense networks, where agents generally have abundant social information? In this work, we conduct an experiment to compare social-learning outcomes on sparse and dense networks. We study a sequential social-learning environment where agents on an observation network take turns guessing a state. We find that later agents learn substantially better on sparse networks than dense networks.
We place subjects in sequential networks of 40 agents with randomly-generated links that determine their observations. Each agent has a 25% chance of observing each predecessor in the sparse treatment and a 75% chance in the dense treatment. The subjects know the network-generating process and must guess the binary state using their private signals and their social observations about the guesses made by their predecessors, with incentives for accuracy. Prior to data collection, we pre-registered a measure of long-run learning accuracy: the fraction of the final 8 agents who correctly guess the state. Comparing this pre-registered measure on 130 sparse networks versus 130 dense networks, we find denser networks lead to worse learning accuracy. In denser networks, the average accuracy of the last fifth of the agents improves on the autarky benchmark (i.e., the average accuracy if no one can observe others' actions) by 5.7%, but this improvement is 12.6% in sparse networks. Thus, the longrun accuracy gains from social learning are twice as large in the sparse treatment as in the dense treatment (p-value 0.0239).
In addition to its direct implications about the role of network density in social learning, this finding provides indirect evidence supporting models of naive inference in which agents neglect the correlations between their observations (as in Eyster and Rabin (2010) ). Motivated by a theoretical result from Dasaratha and He (2019) , we compute the predictions of the naive model, finding that later subjects are indeed more likely to be correct on sparse networks than dense networks. The basic intuition is that an agent with correlation neglect ends up placing too much weight on the actions of the very early movers, as these actions will have influenced the play of many predecessors observed by the agent. When the network is denser, this over-weighting is more severe and so naive agents' guesses are less accurate.
On the other hand, we show the doubling of accuracy gain is inconsistent with the rational social-learning model. Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) 's results imply that rational agents learn asymptotically in environments matching our setup. We adapt their methods to provide lower bounds on the accuracy of rational agents 33 through 40 in our experiment. We also find that network density has no statistically significant effect on overall guess accuracy averaged across all 40 agents, because early agents are more accurate on the dense network. This result is another prediction of naive inference.
Related Literature
Our experimental results add to a growing body of evidence that humans do not properly account for correlations in social-learning settings. Enke and Zimmermann (2018) show that correlation neglect is prevalent even in simple environments where the observed information sources are mechanically correlated. In a field experiment where agents interact repeatedly with the same set of neighbors, Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, and Xandri (2018) find agents fail to account for redundancies.
Most closely related to the present work, the laboratory games in Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsacker (2015) and Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015) directly evaluate the naive inference behavioral assumption. Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsacker (2015) find that on the complete observation network agents' behavior is closer to the rational model than the naive model. On a more complex network the naive model matches more observations than the rational model, and there is little anti-imitation (which would be required for correct Bayesian inference).
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Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015) find most observations are consistent with naive inference (which they call quasi-Bayesian updating) in a setting where agents have limited information about the network. These experiments suggest naiveté may be more likely in settings where agents either have a limited knowledge of the true network or the network is known but very complicated. In these settings, the correct Bayesian belief given one's observations can be far from obvious, so agents are more likely to resort to behavioral heuristics.
Unlike this previous work, our experiment tests the comparative statics predictions of naive and rational learning with respect to variations in the learning environment. This allows us to cleanly test redundancy neglect against rational updating. Our approach allows us to focus on long-term learning outcomes-which are the welfare-relevant metrics as we consider changes in the environment-instead of solely on measuring individual behavior.
There is also some conflicting evidence. In the laboratory, Grimm and Mengel (2014) consider an environment with repeated interaction with fixed neighbors. They find mixed evidence in comparing naive and Bayesian updating, but also report that agents respond to correlations. Their experiment contains a number of different network structures, but focuses on the effects of varying information about the network structure (rather than the effects of changes in network structure).
Theoretical Motivation

Model
The state of the world ω ∈ {0, 1} takes one of two possible values with equal probabilities. The set of agents is indexed by i ∈ N. Agents move in the order of their indices, each acting once.
On her turn, each agent i observes a private signal s i ∈ R, as well as the actions of some previous agents. Then, i chooses an action a i ∈ {0, 1} to maximize the probability that
Private signals (s i ) are i.i.d. and Gaussian conditional on the state of the world. When
Here σ 2 > 0 is the conditional variance of the private signal. In addition to her signal, each agent i observes the action of each predecessor with probability q. These observations are i.i.d. Agents observed by i are called the neighbors of i, and the sets of neighbors define a (random) directed network.
We compare two kinds of agents: rational agents and naive agents. Rational agents play the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Naive agents optimize given the following misspecified beliefs:
Assumption 1 (Naive Inference Assumption). Each agent wrongly believes that each predecessor chooses an action to maximize her expected payoff based on only her private signal, and not on her observation of other agents.
Equivalently, naive agents believe that each of their neighbors observe no other agents. Besides the error in Assumption 1, naive agents are otherwise correctly specified and optimize their expected utility given their mistaken beliefs.
Assumption 1 was introduced in a sequential learning setting where agents observe all predecessors by Eyster and Rabin (2010) . Their work refers to this form of inference as "best-response trailing naive inference" (BRTNI). Dasaratha and He (2019) suggest an empirical test for the naive inference assumption: in the context of sequential learning on uniform random networks, does increasing the linkformation probability q cause more inaccurate long-run beliefs? In this paper, we experimentally test this comparative static in networks of 40 agents by comparing learning outcomes in sparse networks (where q = 1 4
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).
The naive-learning model and the rational-learning model make competing predictions about this comparative static. The intuition 2 for naive learning comes from Dasaratha and He (2019) , which suggests that overweighting due to correlation neglect is more severe on dense networks. We do not expect human subjects to behave exactly according to Assumption 1 -for example, the meta-analysis of Weizsäcker (2010) reports that laboratory subjects in sequential learning games suffer from autarky bias, underweighting their social observations relative to the payoff-maximizing strategy. However, the comparative static prediction of the naive model remains robust even after introducing any fraction of autarkic agents. (red curve).
that the 33 rd rational agent is correct at least 96.8% of the time, with the lower bound on the probability of correct learning continuing to increase up to the 40 th agent, who is correct at least 97.5% of the time. In addition to suggesting that the asymptotic result of Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) very likely holds by the 40 th agent, the fact that this lower bound for accuracy on the dense network is so close to perfect learning proves the 40 th rational agent could not perform substantially better on the sparse network, 4 contrary to the predicted improvement for the 40 th naive agent shown in Figure 1 .
Finally, we intuitively expect more connections to also help rational agents in the shortand medium-run as they can adjust for potential redundancies in information. For example, on the complete network with continuous actions, rational agents can back out private signals of every predecessor by observing their actions, so every agent i does better on the complete network than under any less dense network structure.
We experimentally test the predictions of the naive and the rational models by evaluating the comparative static as we vary network density. We thus provide indirect evidence for the naive inference assumption, complementing the direct measurement of behavior in Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsacker (2015) and Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015) .
Beyond providing another form of evidence, we believe this indirect test is a valuable complement to direct tests of behavior because we use the welfare-relevant outcome, namely the accuracy of beliefs, as our dependent variable. Even if individual behavior tends to match redundancy neglect models in simple or stylized settings, one might be concerned that in practice theoretical results about aggregate learning need not hold for complex environments. So if a policy intervention altering the observation network is feasible, for example, experiments using welfare-relevant outcomes as their dependent variables give more explicit guidance as to the consequences of that change.
Experimental Design
We conducted our experiment on the online labor platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) using Qualtrics survey software.
We pre-registered our experimental protocol and regression specification, including the dependent variable to measure the accuracy of social learning and the target sample size, prior to the start of the experiment in August 2017. The pre-registration document can be found on the registry website at https://aspredicted.org/yp6eq.pdf and is also included in the Appendix.
We recruited 1040 subjects satisfying the selection criteria described in the Appendix. Each subject also needed to complete three comprehension questions (which were scenarios in the game with a dominant choice); MTurk users who incorrectly answered one or more comprehension questions were excluded from the experiment. The experiment was carried out in fall 2017.
In addition to comprehension questions, we restricted to subjects located in the United States who had completed at least 50 previous MTurk tasks with a lifetime approval rate of at least 90%. Subjects were not permitted to participate in more than one round of our experiment. There were at most 15 subjects who did not complete all trials, implying a completion rate of at least 98.5%. These non-completers were excluded and replaced by new subjects.
Each trial consisted of 40 agents who were asked to each make a binary guess between two a priori equally likely states of the world, L (for left) and R (for right). The states were color-coded to make instructions and observations more reader-friendly. Agents are assigned positions in the sequence and move in order. Each MTurk subject participated in 10 trials, all in the same position (depending on when they participated in the experiment). The grouping of subjects into trials was independent across trials. Subjects received $0.25 for completing the experiment and $0.25 per correct guess, for a maximum possible payment of $2.75. Subjects ordinarily took less than 10 minutes to complete their participation and earned on average $2.08, so the incentives were quite large for an MTurk task.
In each trial, every agent received a private signal, which had the Gaussian distribution N (−1, 4) in state L and the Gaussian distribution N (1, 4) in state R. These distributions were presented visually in the instructions. Along with the value of their signal, subjects were told the probability of each state conditional on only their private signal. Each trial was also associated with a density parameter, either q = . A random network was generated for each trial by linking each agent with each predecessor with probability q. Each MTurk subject was assigned into either the "sparse" or the "dense" treatment, then placed into 10 trials either all with q = 1 4 or all with q = 3 4
. So there were 520 subjects and 130 trials for each treatment. Agents were told the actions of each linked predecessor and the link probability q (but not the full realized network, which could not be presented succinctly).
In each trial agents viewed their private signal and any social observations and were asked to guess the state. States, signals, and networks were independently drawn across trials. Experimental instructions and an example of a choice screen from a trial are shown in the Appendix.
Results
Let y i,j be the indicator random variable with y i,j = 1 if agent i in trial j correctly guesses the state, y i,j = 0 otherwise. Defineỹ j := 1 8 40 i=33 y i,j as the fraction of the last eight agents in trial j who correctly guess the state. We test learning outcomes for the final eight agents because welfare depends on long-run learning outcomes in large societies and these agents better approximate long-run outcomes. By using only her private signal, an agent can correctly guess the state 69.15% of the time.
5 We callỹ j −0.6915 the gain from social learning in trial j, as this quantity represents improvement relative to the autarky benchmark. We find that the average gain from social learning is 8.73 percentage points for the q = treatment. Social learning improves accuracy on the sparse networks by twice as much as on the dense networks. To test for statistical significance, we consider the regressioñ
} is the network density parameter for trial j. Recall that each subject was assigned into ten random trials with the same network density and in the same sequential position. This means for two different trials j = j , the error terms j and j are close to independent since there are likely very few subjects who participated in both trials. Indeed, our estimates are identical whether we use robust standard errors or not.
We estimate β 1 = −0.092 with a p-value of 0.0239 (see Table 1 ). These findings are consistent with naive updating but not with rational updating, as discussed in Section 2.
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This difference in the gains from social learning is not driven by different rates of autarky among the two treatments for the last eight agents. We say an agent goes against her signal if she guesses L when her signal is positive or guesses R when her signal is negative. Within the last eight rounds, there are 138 instances of agents going against their signals in the q = treatment. This shows the observed difference in accuracy is due to social learning being differentially effective on the two network structures.
However, the q = . The point of overtaking happens at a later round in practice than in theory, because our experimental subjects rely more on their private signal than predicted by the naive model, 7 consistent with the metaanalysis of Weizsäcker (2010) . We do not directly test alternate behavioral models for two reasons. First, given the complex signal and network structures, such tests will be very noisy in our data. Second, because the spaces of possible networks and actions have very high dimension, determining the action each agent would take assuming common knowledge of rationality is computationally infeasible. However, in the next subsection we provide some evidence that our findings are driven by naive herding rather than other behavioral mechanisms.
Evidence of herding
In this section, we present three pieces of evidence suggesting that naive herding is the mechanism generating the differential learning learning accuracy in the two treatments.
(1) Distribution of overall accuracy. , and also a larger standard deviation (11.36 percentage points versus 9.12 percentage points). This is suggestive evidence for naive herding, as in the dense networks setting we both observe more games where agents do very badly overall (from herding on the wrong state) and more games where agents do very well overall (from herding on the correct state).
(2) Effect of misleading private signals for early agents on the accuracy of later agents. Call a private signal misleading if it is positive while the state is L, or if it is negative while the state is R. If naive herding is the mechanism, we would expect misleading early signals to be more harmful for eventual learning accuracy on denser networks than on sparser networks. To test this, we expand our baseline regression to include two additional regressors: the number m j of the first fifth of agents who receive misleading signals in network j, and its interaction effect with network density. That is, we estimatẽ
The difference in the marginal effect of a misleading early signal for learning accuracy on the dense network (q = ) is 1 2 γ in the above specification. As reported in Table 4 in Appendix B, we find γ = 0.05 with a p-value of 0.0923. This means each misleading signal among the first fifth of agents harms the average accuracy of the last fifth of agents in the same game by an extra 2.5 percentage points in dense networks compared to sparse networks.
(3) Average uncertainty. Based on simulation evidence, we expect naive agents to exhibit more agreement within denser networks. To test this prediction in the data, we consider for each game a set of 30 moving windows centered around periods 6, 7, ... 35, with each window spanning 11 consecutive periods. For each game j and each window w, we compute r j,w ∈ {0, 1 11
, ..., 1} as the fraction of 11 agents in the window who guessed R, and we let u j,w := r j,w · (1 − r j,w ) be a measure of uncertainty within the window.
8 In windows
where agents exhibit a greater degree of agreement, we will see a lower u j,w . Under herding, we expect lower uncertainty on denser networks, as higher density accelerates convergence to a (possibly mistaken) social consensus. We find in the data that the average u j,w is lower among sparse networks than dense networks for all but 1 out of 30 windows. Numerically, the naive herding theory predicts lower average u j,w on denser networks in all 30 windows. 
A.2 Performance of Naive Agents
Consider 40 naive agents on a random network where each agent is linked to each of her predecessors with probability q, i.i.d. across link realizations. The signal structure and payoff structure match the experimental design in Section 3.
We will compute the accuracy of each agent by a recursive calculation. Because naive agents' actions do not depend on the order of predecessors, behavior depends only on the number of agents who have played L and the number of agents who have played R as well as the network. We will compute the distribution over the number of agents from the first n who have played L and the number who have played R recursively.
Assume the state is R. Let P (k, k ) be the probability that k of the first n agents play L and k of the first n agents play R. We define P (k, k ) = 0 if k < 0 or k < 0. The posterior log-likelihood of state R for a naive agent observing one action equal to R (and no signal) is
where Φ and φ are the distribution function and probability density function of a standard Gaussian random variable, respectively. Then we have the recursive relation
where B(i, k, q) is the probability a binomial distribution with parameters k and q is equal to i. The first summand corresponds to the possibility of agent k + k choosing L after k − 1 predecessors choose L and the remainder choose R, and the second summand corresponds to the probability of agent k + k choosing R after k predecessors choose L and the remainder choose R. The binomial coefficients correspond to the possible network realizations. Here we use naiveté, which implies that only the number of observed agents choosing each action matters for behavior and not their order. From these distributions P (·, ·) we can compute the probability that agent n chooses the correct action R:
These probabilities, which we compute numerically, are displayed in Table 3 
C Experimental Instructions
Instructions and an example choice follow. To avoid confusion, the instructions were modified for player 1 in each round to exclude discussion of social observations. 
